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INTRODUCTION

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 19801 (CERCLA or Superfund Law), lists four categories of parties who may be
liable for remediation costs at inactive hazardous waste sites2 : (1) the current owner
or operator of a facility;3 (2) the owner or operator of a disposal facility at the time
of the disposal of hazardous substances;4 (3) a person who arranged for disposal of
hazardous substances "owned or possessed by such person";5 and (4) a person who
accepted hazardous substances for transport to a disposal facility, if that person
chose the disposal facility.6 This Article will examine the third category, the
"arranger," and analyze the role played by the qualifier owned orpossessedby such
person. On its face, it would seem the statute should impose liability on the one
who caused the environmental problem by arranging for the disposal of waste
regardless of who has title to the waste. Indeed, asking who owned the waste
sounds a lot like asking who owned the bullet after there has been a shooting.
No criminal defendant would argue, "I did not own the bullet; therefore, I
cannot be responsible for having shot the victim." However, Congress has created
a system in which waste dumpers can argue, "I did not own the waste; therefore, I
cannot be responsible for its disposal." Courts have struggled to determine why
Congress included this ownership requirement, sometimes even concluding that
anyone with the authority to arrange for disposal of the waste has sufficient control
of it to be deemed one who owned or possessed the waste. This view eliminates
the concept of ownership and possession from the statute because it suggests that
everyone who arranges for disposal owns or possesses the waste. Other courts have
reversed that reasoning and concluded arranger liability does not require that one

1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000).
2. Inactive hazardous waste sites are disposal or treatment facilities that have been abandoned or
closed. CHARLES M. CHADD ET AL., AVOIDING LIABILITY FORHAZARDOUS WASTE: RCRA, CERCLA,
AND RELATED CORPORATE LAW ISSUES A-27 (1991). Congress recognized that existing legislation only
applied prospectively. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, pt. 1,at 17-18 (1980), as reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6119, 6120. In response, Congress enacted CERCLA "to abate and control the vast problems associated
with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites." Id. pt.1, at 22.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (providing that "the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility" shall
be liable).
4. Id. § 9607(a)(2) (imposing liability on "any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous
substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of').
5. Id. § 9607(a)(3) (imposing liability on "any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment,
of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility
or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous
substances").
6. Id. § 9607(a)(4) (imposing liability on "any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response
costs, of a hazardous substance").
7. See infra notes 105-18 and accompanying text.
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make any arrangements for disposal because anyone who at some point owned or
possessed hazardous waste is responsible as an arranger wherever the waste ends
up.8 By this view, the language owned or possessed by expands the meaning of
arranger to include anyone who owned or possessed the waste.
Recently the Third Circuit reviewed the appellate decisions on arranger liability
and noted a number of disagreements "among our sister circuits" regarding the role
of ownership in arranger liability.9 Part of the difficulty courts have had in
explaining the role of the language owned or possessed by in arranger liability
stems from the wide variety of scenarios that give rise to arranger liability."0 This
Article will argue there are not significant disagreements among the courts
regarding the role of ownership; instead, there are four distinct scenarios that give
rise to arranger liability, and the role of the language owned orpossessedby differs
depending on the scenario. Within each scenario, however, there is actually a great
deal of consistency. In addition, this Article will show how the definition of
arrangerderived from this analysis can be used to resolve some other difficulties
courts have had in determining who is an arranger.
II.

PRE-SUPERFUND ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY

A.

Common Law Actions: Nuisance and Strict Liability for Abnormally
DangerousActivities

Prior to the Superfund Law, there were a variety of attempts to impose
environmental liability through the common law." Among the leading theories
were nuisance and strict liability for unreasonably dangerous activities.12 None of
the common law theories, however, provided a means to require remediation or to
require a person who caused an environmental problem to fund remediation."

8. See discussion infra Part Il.B.1.
9. Morton Int'l Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 2003); see infra notes
196-220 and accompanying text.
10. Compare Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir.
1990) (concluding that a manufacturer may be liable as an arranger although the manufacturer does not
decide "how, when, and by whom" hazardous waste is disposed), with United States v. Ne. Pharm. &
Chem. Co. (NEPACCO), 810 F.2d 726, 743-44 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding defendant's plant supervisor
individually liable as an arranger where he knew about, supervised, and was directly responsible for
arranging for disposal of hazardous waste).
11. See H.R.REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 62 (1980), as reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6139
(noting that one goal of CERCLA legislation was to "clarify and codify long-standing common law
theories as they relate to liability for damages caused by hazardous waste disposal activities").
12. Jeff Civins & Mary Mendoza, Transactional Environmental Due Diligence: When Is
Diligence Due?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 2006, at 22, 22.
13. H. R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 62. Senator Gore stated that "[e]xisting state tort laws present
a convoluted maze of requirements under which a victim is confronted with a complex of often
unreasonable requirements." Id.
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A nuisance is the unreasonable use of one's property in a manner that harms
others in the use of their property. 4 The interest protected is a property interest15 :
the right to occupy one's property with "reasonable comfort."'" Pollution of a
stream constituted a nuisance in several early environmental cases. 7 The common
thread throughout the cases was that each property owner discharged waste into a
body of water that either abutted or passed through its property and caused injury
to other users of that body of water. Several other uses of property have also been
found to be nuisances, including uses that result in noise, 8 odors, 9 and flooding. 0
Among the limitations on the effectiveness of a nuisance action are the
emphasis on the use of one's property and the remedies it provides. Remedies for
a nuisance action can include injunctive relief or damages2 but do not include an
obligation to remediate. The emphasis on the use of one's property means there will
be many cases in which one party disposes of waste in a manner that causes injury
to another party or to the public, but there will be no nuisance. There will be no
nuisance because the injury either does not result from the defendant's use of the
defendant's property (for example, where the defendant is a waste transporter who
dumps waste on plaintiff s property) or because the injury to the plaintiff does not
affect plaintiffs use of plaintiffs property (for example, where the defendant
dumps waste on defendant's property). Thus, if the goal is to find a remedy for
injuries caused by the disposal of hazardous waste, a nuisance action does not
satisfy the goal on a consistent basis.

14. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 86, at 617 (5th
ed. 1984).
15. Id. at 618 ("A private nuisance is a civil wrong, based on a disturbance of rights in land.").
16. Id. § 87, at 619 ("The ownership or rightful possession of land necessarily involves the
right.., to... some reasonable comfort and convenience in its occupation.").
17. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Fairmont, 247 N.W. 572, 572 (Minn. 1933) (holding that plaintiff
presented sufficient evidence that defendant's pollution of a stream constituted a nuisance); Beach v.
Sterling Iron & Zinc Co., 33 A. 286, 290 (N.J. Ch. 1895) (identifying stream pollution as a nuisance),
aff'dsub nom. Sterling Iron & Zinc Co. v. Sparks Mfg. Co., 41 A. 1117 (N.J. 1896) (per curiam); cf
Rose v. Standard Oil Co., 185 A. 251, 254 (R.I. 1936) (citing Rose v. Socony-Vacuum Corp., 173 A.
627 (R.1. 1934)) (finding a nuisance where oil, gasoline, and other substances escaped from defendant's
refiner and polluted plaintiffs drinking water).
18. KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 87, at 619 20 (citing Gorman v. Sabo, 122 A.2d 475 (Md.
1956); Borsvold v. United Dairies, 81 N.W.2d 378 (Mich. 1957); Jenner v. Collins, 52 So. 2d 638
(Miss. 1951); Hooks v. Int'l Speedways, Inc., 140 S.E.2d 387 (N.C. 1965); Guarinav. Bogart, 180 A.2d
557 (Pa. 1962)).
19. Id. (citing Hedrick v. Tubbs, 92 N.E.2d 561 (Ind. Ct. App. 1950); Higgins v. DecorahProduce
Co., 242 N.W. 109 (Iowa 1932); Sarraillon v. Stevenson, 43 N.W.2d 509 (Neb. 1950); Johnson v.
Drysdale, 285 N.W. 301 (S.D. 1939); Aldred's Case, 9 Coke 57b, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611)).
20. Id. (citing William Tackaberry Co. v. Sioux City Serv. Co., 132 N.W. 945 (Iowa 1911);
Mueller v. Fruen, 30 N.W. 886 (Minn. 1886); Town ofRindge v. Sargent, 9 A. 723 (N.H. 1887)).
21. Id. § 89, at 637-41 (citations omitted).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol59/iss1/5

4

Gershonwitz: Superfund Arranger Liability: Why Ownership of the Hazardous Subs

2007]

SUPERFUND "ARRANGER" LIABILITY

Strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities has also been a common law
source of environmental liability. 22 This doctrine, often referred to as the rule of
Rylands v. Fletcher, provides strict liability for uses of property that are deemed
to be abnormal or unreasonably dangerous.24 Most cases like Rylands v. Fletcher
would also be nuisance cases,25 and, as a remedy for environmental contamination,
they suffer from many of the same limitations. Moreover, the doctrine is based on
the idea that the defendant is making use of its property in a manner that is
abnormal. 26 This can vary the doctrine's application depending on location or other
factors and provide, for example, that the use of solvent cleaners, which can pollute
the groundwater, could be abnormally dangerous in a populated residential area but
not abnormally dangerous in an industrial area. Thus, neither nuisance law nor strict
liability in tort provided the type of remedy Congress was looking for when it
created the arranger concept a remedy for the presence of chemical poisons in the
environment."
B. InitialProposalsfor the Superfund Law
The Superfund Law was needed, in part, because the common law did not
provide a liability mechanism for the past disposals or releases of hazardous
substances. As different versions of the Superfund Law moved through Congress,
liability was initially attributed to the "generator" of the waste.28 The generator of
the waste is a key player in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA), 29 the regulatory program that governs hazardous waste activities. Thus,
when Congress was debating the Superfund Law, the generator was already a
familiar figure in environmental law and a likely candidate for liability. Generation
of hazardous waste is defined in RCRA as "the act or process of producing
hazardous waste."3 Generation, therefore, implies ownership or control because
one cannot produce something without at some time owning or controlling the thing

22. See, e.g., Luthringer v. Moore, 190 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1948) (imposing strict liability on a
fumigating contractor for fumes resulting from acid vapors); Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, 20
A. 900, 900 01 (Md. 1890) (citations omitted) (imposing strict liability on the operator of a fertilizer
factory).
23. 3 L.R.E. & 1.App. 330 (H.L. 1868) (citations omitted).
24. Id.at 33941.
25. KEETON ET AL., supra note 14, § 78, at 552 53 (citations omitted).
26. Id. at551 (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 519 20 (1938)) (noting that while the
Restatement of Torts uses the phrase ultrahazardousactivities, American courts have continued to stress
"where the thing is done").
27. See Sen. Robert T. Stafford, Why Superjund Was Needed, EPA J., June 1981, at 8, 9.
28. See H.R. REP. No.96-1016, pt.1,
at 29 (1980), as reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6116, 6132
("Subsection (b) [of section 3041] defines the term 'responsible party' to mean any person who...
generated or disposed of a substantial portion of the hazardous waste treated, stored, or disposed of at
an inactive [hazardous waste] site.").
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992K (2000). For the section specifically addressing standards applicable
to generators of hazardous waste, see 42 U.S.C. § 6922.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(6) (2000).
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produced. Generator liability means that one who creates waste has an obligation
to make sure that the waste is disposed of properly and is liable if it is not.
Making the generator responsible is consistent with the remedial goals of the
Superfund Law, which include (a) requiring private parties to remediate inactive
hazardous waste sites;3' (b) imposing liability on those who contributed to the
presence of the waste;32 and (c) imposing liability on those who benefited from the
presence of the waste. 3 The generator contributes to the presence of the waste by
creating it and benefits from the presence of the waste both by profiting from the
industrial activity that created the waste and by saving the costs of proper handling
and disposal.
A second congressional proposal based liability on causation.34 Under this
proposal, a person would be liable if that person caused or contributed to the
contamination. The proposal appeared to be based mostly on tort concepts because
it based liability on the defendant's actions, not the defendant's status. In addition,
there is language in the legislative history of the Superfund Law that suggests
courts should look to the common law of torts in interpreting this provision. 5
When the Superfund Law was passed, neither the generator concept nor the
caused or contributed language survived. 6 Instead, the enacted statute included the
arranger concept.37 Notably, the legislative history of the bill that became the
Superfund Law does not provide any help in understanding the new arranger
concept.38 The generator concept may not have survived because the Superfund

31. H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt.1, at 17.
32. H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt.1, at 68; see United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co.
(NEPACCO), 810 F.2d 726, 733-34 (8th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted) (discussing the legislative
history of CERCLA and concluding that Congress intended to impose the cost on "those parties who
created and profited from the sites"); see also United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361,
1393 (D.N.H. 1985) (quoting United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1073 (D.N.J 1981)) (noting that
the legislative history of CERCLA indicates Congress intended for a broad definition of contributing);
United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162,221 22 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (stating that strict
liability for off-site generators is an important attribute of CERCLA); Keith M. Lyons, Comment,
Everyone Pays to Clean Up America: A Discussion of CERCLA Section 107(a)(3) and the Term
"ArrangedforDisposal,"28 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 589, 596-600(1992) (citations omitted) (discussing
the legislative history and goals of CERCLA).
33. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 68 (arguing that liability for "causation" could be more
fair than liability for "generation" because mere generation does not necessarily cause a release).
34. Compare H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 14-15 (proposed text) and H.R. REP. No. 96-1016,
pt.l, at 33 34 (stating that the proposed text retains common law causation principles), with
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 961016 § 107, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000)) (imposing liability
regardless of causation).
35. H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 68 (discussing the relationship between the proposed bill and
existing tort law).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000).
37. Id. § 9607(a)(3).
38. There are references to this change in the legislative history, but none really help in
understanding the concept. For example, Senator Randolph stated,
The liability regime in this substitute contains some changes in language from that
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Law, as passed, bases liability on the release or disposal of hazardous substances,
not hazardous waste,39 and the generator concept relates specifically to waste and
not hazardous substances.
111.

GENERATOR LIABILITY CASES

A.

GeneratorsLiable as Arrangers

If the statute replaced generator liability with arranger liability, many of the
early court decisions missed that distinction, as they commonly referred to arranger
liability as generator liability.4" The rule that emerges from these cases in this first
scenario is that the waste generator is liable as an arranger without regard to
intent, 4' knowledge of the disposal site,4 or other possible liable parties. 4 The
arranger discussion in these cases reads as if the statute either defines the arranger
as the generator or states that the generator of the waste is liable.
By emphasizing generator liability, these cases tended to eliminate the owned
orpossessed by requirement from the statute. If the statute substituted "generator"
for "any person who ... arranged for disposal or treatment,"44 then there would be
no need to parse the statutory language to determine whether a generator is one who
arranged for disposal of waste owned or possessed by said party. This emphasis on
45
generator liability was so influential that the Violet v. Picillo
decision, written less
than six years after the passage of the Superfund Law, could cite many other cases
for the proposition that arranger liability requires proof of four basic elements:
(1) that the generatordisposed of hazardous substances; (2) at a
facility which contains at the time of discovery hazardous

in the bill reported by the Committee on Environment and Public Works. The
changes were made in recognition of the difficulty in prescribing in statutory
terms liability standards which will be applicable in individual cases. The changes
do not reflect a rejection of the standards in the earlier bill.
126 CONG. REC. 23, 30932 (1980). Congressman Florio stated that "a strong liability scheme will insure
that those responsible for releases of hazardous substances will be held strictly liable for costs of
response." 126 CONG. REc. 24, 31964 (1980).
39. See supranotes 4-6 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1306 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (imposing liability
on parties for arranging for disposal of hazardous substances and finding that the arranger concept
includes generators); United States v. Hardage, 761 F. Supp. 1501, 1511 (W.D. Okla. 1990) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)) (noting that generator liability is imposed on one who arranged for disposal of
hazardous waste); Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1288 (D.R.I. 1986) (noting that generator
liability is imposed on one who arranged for disposal, treatment, or transport to hazardous waste
facility), overruledon other grounds by United States v. Davis, 794 F. Supp. 67, 71 (D.R.l. 1992).
41. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. at 1304 (citations omitted).
42. Hardage,761 F. Supp. at 1511 (quoting United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d
1373, 1381 (8th Cir. 1989)).
43. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. at 1310.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (2000).
45. 648 F. Supp. 1283 (D.R.I. 1986).
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substances of the kind the generator disposed; (3) there is a
release or a threatened release of that or any hazardous substance;
(4) which triggers the incurrence of response costs."
What about the generator who did not take the time to make arrangements for
disposal? Courts have held such generators liable. As the court in United States v.
Ward47 stated, to hold that such generators are not liable would permit generators
to avoid liability "by closing their eyes to the method in which their hazardous
wastes were disposed of. '48 Or, as the court in United States v. Conservation
Chemical Co. 49 noted, to provide that a generator must make arrangements for
disposal would lead to the "anomalous" conclusion that a generator who took care
to designate the destination of the waste is liable, while one who did not is not
liable. ° Another explanation for courts consistently finding generators liable is that
generators can do nothing with hazardous waste except dispose of it or treat it by
minimizing the risks associated with it." l Therefore, if an entity generated
hazardous waste but does not currently possess it, the entity must have arranged for
its disposal or treatment.
The assumption underlying each of the above cases is that the generator of
hazardous waste is always liable as an arranger. This assumption can be understood
in one of two ways: either the courts have ignored the statute, or they have
understood that the concept of arranger was meant to include more than just the
generator. Because this Article is not prepared to propose that so many courts and
commentators got it wrong, this Article will proceed with the second
interpretation the courts have assumed Congress's use of arranger was intended
to include the generator and something in addition to the generator.
If arranger means "generator plus," then to understand the plus we need to
examine what applies to the arranger concept that does not apply to the generator
concept. The answer is the language owned orpossessed by." This language would
be totally superfluous if arranger meant generator because one cannot create
something without owning or possessing that creation. Thus, the cases finding
generators liable as arrangers provide the first clue to understanding the presence
of the owned or possessed by language in the statute by not addressing that
language. The language owned or possessed by is necessary to inform courts that
there can be arrangers who are not generators.

46. Id.at 1228 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp.
162, 190 (W.D. Mo. 1985); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1333 (E.D. Pa. 1983); United
States v. S.C. Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 991 92 (D.S.C. 1984)).
47. 618 F. Supp. 884 (E.D.N.C. 1985).
48. Id at895.
49. 619 F. Supp. 162.
50. Id. at 234.
51. See infra notes 74 76 and accompanying text.

52. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (2000).
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B. Sale Cases: Sale of Products Containing Hazardous Substances as the
Basis for Liability
The second scenario in which arranger liability issues arise is where a
defendant that was alleged to have arranged for the disposal or treatment of waste
claimed it was not the generator of waste; instead, it was the seller of a product that
contained hazardous substances which were later used by another party in a process
that generated waste and said waste was disposed of or released by another party.
If the generator cases involve waste that has been disposed of and focus on the
defendant's relationship to the waste-whether the defendant is the
generator-then the sale cases focus on the defendant's actions.
The sale cases also reveal another anomaly in the language of the statute. The
statute is based on hazardous substances, not hazardous waste, and the generator
concept is a waste-related concept; yet the arranger section speaks specifically
about "disposal or treatment," 3 both of which, as described by courts, are actions
related to waste and not to useful substances.5 4 Thus, while the distinction between
the generation of hazardous waste largely an RCRA concept and hazardous
substances-the basis of Superfund liability-is an important one, this distinction
is blurred with regard to arranger liability because hazardous waste, and not
hazardous substances, is disposed of or sent for treatment.
1. Sale of Useful Hazardous Substances
In Freeman v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc.," the Second Circuit provided an
explanation for why sellers of useful hazardous substances are not subject to
arranger liability.56 Glaxo, upon closing a facility, sold chemical reactants used in
its facility to Freeman Industries Incorporated (FIT) for use in FIT's business.5 7 FIT
used some of the chemicals in its business, stored some of them, and sold some of
them." The stored chemicals became the source of a remedial action by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) at the FIT facility. 9 FIT commenced athird
party action for contribution against Glaxo, claiming that Glaxo had arranged for
disposal of its chemicals at the FI1 facility.6" Glaxo' s defense was that it merely sold

53. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). The statute imposes liability on "any person who by contract,
agreement, or otherwise arrangedjordisposalor treatment,or arranged with a transporter for transport
for disposalor treatment,of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person." Id. (emphasis
added).
54. See AM Int'l, Inc. v. Int'l Forging Equip. Corp., 982 F.2d 989, 999 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Prudential Ins. Co. v. U.S. Gypsum, 711 F. Supp. 1244, 1253, 1255 (D.N.J. 1989)).
55. 189 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).
56. Id.at164.
57. Id. at 162. Glaxo saved transportation costs by not taking the reactants to its new facility in
North Carolina. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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the chemicals and did not arrange for their disposal. 6 After citing cases holding that
one cannot circumvent the Superfund Law by characterizing disposal as a sale,62 the
court noted that Glaxo sold valuable products to FIT for use or resale." The court
determined that these were virgin chemicals, not waste,64 and liability for the
arrangement for disposal requires the presence of waste.65 Therefore, Glaxo did not
arrange for disposal at the FIT facility.66
In Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point,Thomasville & Denton R.R. ,67 the Fourth
Circuit provided further analysis of how to determine whether a transaction is a sale
or an arrangement for disposal.68 The court explained that the key factors "[i]n
determining whether a transaction was for the discard of hazardous substances or
for the sale of valuable materials" were the intent of the parties, the value and state
of the materials, and the usefulness of the product.69
The transaction in Pneumo was for the sale of used bearings to be processed
into new bearings.7" The processing generated waste, but the court found that the
essence of the transaction was payment in exchange for bearings, not an attempt to
dispose of unwanted metal.7 Thus, the seller did not arrange for disposal.72
2.

Intent to Arrange for Disposal of Waste During the Sale of Useful
HazardousSubstances

The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Cello-FoilProducts, Inc.,7 addressed a
more complex transaction in which there were elements of both a sale of a useful
product and the disposal of waste.74 The court recognized that if the material at
issue-the subject of the transaction-is waste, the transaction is an arrangement

61. Id. at 163. Based on Glaxo's defense, the district court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment. Id.
62. Id.at 164 (citing Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R., 142 F.3d
769, 775 (4th Cir. 1998); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317
(11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1381 (8th Cir. 1989));
see also Glaxo, 189 F.3d at 164 ("[A] waste generator's liability under CERCLA is not to be... faciley
circumvented by its characterization of its arrangements as sales." (alteration in original) (quoting New
York v. Gen. Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 297 (N.D.N.Y. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
63. Glaxo, 189 F.3d at 164.
64. Id.The court noted that Fll used some of the chemicals and sold others. Id.
65. Id.The court stated that "[b]ecause the definition of 'disposal' refers to 'waste,' only
transactions that involve 'waste' constitute arrangements for disposal ....
Id.
66. Id.
67. 142 F.3d 769 (4th Cir. 1998).
68. Id.at 775.
69. Id. If the intent is to buy and sell, the transaction is not an arrangement for disposal; if the
product is useful, it is not waste. Id.
70. Id.at 772.
71. Id.at 775.
72. Id. at 775 76.
73. 100 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1995).
74. Id.at 1230.
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for disposal.75 Conversely, ifthe material at issue is a useful product, the transaction
is not an arrangement for disposal.76
In Cello-Foil,the defendants were purchasers of solvents.7 The contract for
sale provided that the seller, Thomas Solvent (Thomas), would deliver solvents in
reusable drums. 78 The contract price included a deposit for each drum. 79 The
purchasers used the solvents and returned the drums to Thomas who cleaned and
reused the drums.80 The government argued the contract was implicitly an
arrangement for the disposal of waste because the returned drums contained some8
solvent residue which was the source of the contamination at the Thomas facility. '
However, the district court found the defendants could not be liable because they
lacked the intent to dispose of waste.82
The court began its analysis by noting that the legislation does not define the
phrase arrangefor.83 The court noted the Seventh Circuit had defined arrangefor
to include an element of intent.84 In Ancast Industrial Corp. v. Detrex Corp.,85
Judge Posner reasoned the phrase arrangefor disposal contemplates a case in
which a person wants to get rid of something.86 Thus, if the defendant did not intend
87
to get rid of a hazardous substance, there has been no arrangement for disposal.
The Cello-Foilcourt expanded this concept, concluding that intent is a requirement
because arrangement embraces concepts similar to contract and agreement. 88 To
arrange means to "'make preparations' or 'plan"'; 8 9 both are actions that require
intent. Thus, the parties' intent can determine how the transaction will be
characterized.
To determine the parties' intent, the courts looked to the totality of the
circumstances, not to how the parties characterized their transaction.9" Thus, in
Cello-Foil, the court noted that by leaving solvents in the drums, which the
defendants knew Thomas would take away and dispose of, one could infer that the
defendants intended to dispose of those solvents. 9 In Amcast, on the other hand, the
court found that when a seller of solvents contracts with a transporter for delivery
to a user, not a disposal site, the seller has not arranged for the disposal of the

75.
1993)).
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 1232 n.1 (citing AM

Int'lv. Int'l Forging Equip. Corp., 982 F.2d 989, 999 (6th Cir.

Id. at 1232 n.1 (citing AMInt'l, 982 F.2d at 999).
Id. at 1230.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1231.
Id. (citing Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 1993)).
Id. at 1232 (citing Amcast, 2 F.3d at 751).
2 F.3d 746.
Id. at 751.
Id.
100 F.3d at 1231 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1232.
Id. at 1231.
Id. at 1233.
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solvent.92 The transaction was a sale of a useful product and did not include intent
to dispose of anything.93
The key difference between Cello-Foil and Amcast is what was being
transferred. In Cello-Foil, the defendant transferred waste, and based on that, the
court found the transaction could be an arrangement for disposal if the defendant
had the intent to dispose of the waste.94 In Amcast, on the other hand, the material
was not waste and, therefore, the agreement could not be an arrangement for
disposal.95 Thus, even though both the sale cases and the generator cases rarely
discuss the owned or possessed by language, they are completely different from
each other with regard to that language. The generator cases seldom discuss the
owned or possessed by language, in part, because every generator owned or
possessed the hazardous substances at the time of generation the time the
hazardous substances became hazardous waste. The sale cases seldom discuss the
owned or possessed by language, but for a different reason: while the seller had
ownership or possession at one time, the true seller had no ownership or possession
at the time the hazardous substances became waste. Thus, to find a use for the
language owned orpossessed by, it is necessary to find a defendant that is neither
a generator nor a seller.
C. Employees of Generators
The earliest arranger cases to directly address the owned or possessed by
requirement were cases in which the EPA tried to impose liability on individuals
who allegedly arranged for disposal in their capacity as officers or employees of
corporations that were liable as generators. 6 In United States v. Mottolo, 7 for
example, the court addressed the liability of Carl Sutera, the president and principal
shareholder of defendant Lewis Chemical Corporation.98 Sutera argued he did not
arrange for disposal in part because he never owned or possessed the hazardous
substances. 9 Rather, his employer Lewis Chemical, of which Sutera was the
principal shareholder, owned and possessed the hazardous substances.' The court

92. Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 1993).
93. Id.
94. Cello-Foil, 100 F.3d at 1233-34.
95. Amcast, 2 F.3d at 751.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co. (NEPACCO), 810 F.2d 726, 745 (8th Cir.
1986) (extending liability to corporate officers); United States v. Mottolo, 629 F. Supp. 56, 60 (D.N.H.
1984) (citations omitted) (finding the corporate officer's liability to be a question for the jury).
97. 629 F. Supp. 56.
98. Id. at 58 60.
99. Id. at 58.
100. Id.
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denied Sutera's motion to dismiss because factual issues existed regarding the
extent of Sutera's involvement in the corporation's disposal practices.'0 '
In discussing the issue of ownership or possession ofthe waste, the court found
Sutera could be liable as an arranger without ownership or possession.'0 2 The court
examined the full text of the provision:
[A]ny person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for
transport for disposal or treatment of hazardoussubstancesowned
or possessed by such person, by any otherparty or entity, at any
facility owned or operated by another party or entity and
03
containing such hazardous substances.., shall be liable ....
'
The court reasoned the language owned orpossessedby such person, by any other
party or entity meant the waste could be owned by any other party.' 4 Instead of
reading the passage as written, the court read the passage as if the word or was
between the phrases by such person and by any otherparty or entity.
The passage is difficult to parse. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has described this
section of CERCLA as one that "does not make literal or grammatical sense."'0 5
Most courts, however, have read the phrase by any other party or entity as a
continuation of the phrase arrangedjordisposal,resulting in the construction "one
who arranges for disposal of waste ...by any other party or entity."' °6 This
interpretation means it is important who owns the waste, not who disposes of the
07

waste. 1

The Mottolo court relied on the district court opinion in United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co, Inc. (NEPACCO). °8 The
NEPACCO district court decision addressed the arranger liability of individual

101. Id. at 63. The court noted that, in his deposition, Sutera stated that he made all decisions,
including where waste was disposed of, and that a decision regarding disposal of a toxic chemical could
not have been made by anyone but him. Id.at 59.
102. Id. at 60 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9703(a)(3) (1982)) (citing United States v. Ne. Pharm. Chem.
Co. (NEPACCO), 579 F. Supp. 823, 847 (W.D. Mo. 1984)).
103. Id.at 58 (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
104. Id.at 60 (citing NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 847) ("The provision clearly states that the
person who arranges for disposal or transport for disposal of hazardous substances need not own or
possess the waste.").
105. 452 F.3d 1066, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006).
106. See, e.g., id.at 1082 ("[T]he phrase by any other party or entity refers to ownership of the
waste ....) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Capuano, 381
F.3d 6, 24 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that the phrase by any other party or entity modifies the phrase
arrangedfordisposal, imposing liability where the disposal or treatment was done by another party or
entity).
107. This interpretation points out the difficulty in reading the statute; if this is the intended
reading, one can be liable as an arranger only when arranging for another party or entity to dispose of
the waste and not for disposing of the waste on one's own.
108. Mottolo, 629 F. Supp. at 60 (citing NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 847).
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officers and, like the Mottolo court, found that the defendant need not own or
possess the waste to be liable as an arranger because the statute should be given a
liberal construction to find liability. 1°9
The Eighth Circuit's decision in NEPACCO, addressing the liability of the
plant supervisor, was the first appellate decision to analyze the meaning of owned
or possessed by for purposes of arranger liability. "0 The EPA argued, as it did
successfully in Mottolo, that even though the statute provides for liability for any
person who "arranged for disposal or treatment... of hazardous substances owned
or possessed by such person,"''' ownership and possession were not required.' 2
The court agreed, stating that "requiring proof of personal ownership or actual
physical possession of hazardous substances ... would be inconsistent with the
broad remedial purposes of CERCLA.""' 3
Unlike the Mottolo court, however, the Eighth Circuit did not use the statute's
broad remedial purposes to eliminate the words owned or possessed by from the
statute. Instead, the court interpreted owned or possessed by broadly to include
anyone who had actual control over the waste." 4 Lee, the plant supervisor, owned
or possessed the waste because he had "immediate supervision over, and was
directly responsible for arranging for the transportation and disposal.""' Thus,
unlike Mottolo, which held that one could be liable without possession or
ownership," 6 the NEPACCO court held that ownership and possession should be
read broadly to include people with control of the waste."' The court further
reasoned that because Lee made the arrangements for transport and disposal, he had
sufficient control over the hazardous substances to be viewed as owning or
possessing the substances." 8
The problem with the NEPACCO court's reasoning is that, without overtly
eliminating the owned or possessed by requirement from the statute, the court
interpreted owned or possessed by in a manner that made the language almost
superfluous. If having sufficient control over the waste implies ownership or
possession, and anyone who makes the arrangements for disposal has sufficient
control over the waste, then everyone who arranges for disposal owned or

109. NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. at 847-48.
110. United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co. (NEPACCO), 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1982).
112. NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 743.
113. Id. at 743 (citing Mottolo, 629 F. Supp. 56).
114. Id. ("[T]o impose liability upon only the corporation and not the individual corporate officers
and employees who are responsible for making corporate decisions about the handling and disposal of
hazardous substances would open an enormous, and clearly unintended, loophole in the statutory
scheme.").
115. Id.
116. 629 F. Supp. at 60.
117. NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 743.

118. Id. (noting Lee's personal knowledge, supervision, and responsibility in arranging for
disposal).
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possessed the waste. If that is the case, then what is the role of the words owned or
possessed by in imposing liability?
The NEPACCO court's reasoning has gone largely unchallenged, and nearly
all courts have imposed arranger liability on anyone who had sufficient control of
the waste to arrange for its disposal." 9 Analyzing the sale or disposal line of cases
and NEPACCO together, the breadth of arranger liability becomes apparent. The
sale or disposal line of cases 120 leads to the conclusion that if it was
waste something one wants to rid oneself of then whatever is done with the
waste can be viewed as an arrangement for disposal. NEPACCO stands for the
proposition that if a party made the arrangements for disposal, then that party
owned or possessed the waste. Thus, in search for a role for owned orpossessed by
in the statute, it is necessary to analyze cases in which the defendant is neither the
generator of waste nor the seller of a useful substance, and the transaction does not
overtly deal with waste. In such cases, courts have focused on the defendant's
relationshipto the waste-for example, whether the defendant owned or possessed
2
it in order to find arranger liability.' 1
IV.

THE SUPPLIER OF RAW MATERIALS

A.

United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp.

The line of cases finding arranger liability where the alleged arranger was
neither the generator nor personally involved in the disposal of waste involves
business relationships that, on their face, are completely removed from waste or
disposal of hazardous substances. The court in UnitedStates v. Aceto Agricultural
Chemicals Corp., 12 2 for example, found that a supplier of raw materials who
continued to own those raw materials while they were in the hands of the
processor
23
could be liable for waste generated and disposed of by the processor.
The case arose out of contamination at a site owned and operated by Aidex
Corporation (Aidex), a pesticide formulator.'24 The pesticide industry practice was
for pesticide manufacturers to contract with formulators to mix the pesticide
ingredients and produce commercial grade products for the manufacturer. 5 The
pesticide manufacturers provided Aidex with ingredients and directions for

119. See William B. Johnson, Annotation, Arranger Liability of Nongenerators Pursuant to
§ 107(a)(3) of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
(42 U.S.C.S. § 9607(a)(3)), 132 A.L.R. FED. 77, 92-93 (1996).
120. See discussion supra Part III.B.
121. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281,286 (2d. Cir. 1992)
(finding that the "obligation to exercise control" over disposal makes a party liable as an arranger)
(emphasis added); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1382 (8th Cir. 1989)
(noting that defendant's ownership of the hazardous substance was enough to impose liability).
122. 872 F.2d 1373.
123. Id. at1382.
124. Id. at 1375.
125. Id.
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formulation; Aidex processed the ingredients and returned commercial grade
products to the manufacturers.' 26
The EPA sought to hold six of the eight pesticide manufacturers named as
defendants liable for arranging for disposal of hazardous substances at the Aidex
site. "27
' The EPA's theory alleged three facts: (1) the manufacturers owned the
ingredients that contained the hazardous substances that were released or disposed
of at Aidex; 2 s (2) the manufacturers defined the formulation process for Aidex to
follow; 29 and (3) the manufacturers knew the formulation process would result in
the creation of hazardous waste.3 0
The court began its analysis with a review of the legislative history of
Superfund, noting that "Congress intended that those responsible for problems
caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs."'' The court reasoned
this goal would be thwarted if one could contract away their liability. 132
The defendants argued they had no control over Aidex's operations and,
therefore, could not have arranged for disposal of Aidex's waste.' 33 The court
addressed this by noting that each manufacturer maintained ownership of the
chemicals, which meant they had the authority to control what happened with the
chemicals.' 34 Therefore, the defendants had responsibility for the disposal. 35
The case may stand for the proposition that a business relationship that includes
the ability to control waste disposal is sufficient to create arranger liability.'36 That
proposition appears to align the decision with the NEPACCO 3line
of cases where
7
control of the waste was seen as a basis for arranger liability.
The problem with that theory, however, is that the Aceto case is factually the
inverse of the NEPACCO case. In NEPACCO, one of the individual defendants,

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.at 1378. Further, the manufacturers owned the materials during all phases of the project.
Id.
129. Id. at 1381. Aidex worked on defendants' products at the defendants' direction. Id.
130. Id. at1378. Defendants knew the waste was created "inherent ly]" by the process and knew
Aidex disposed of the waste. Id.
131. Id. at 1380 (quoting Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074,
1081 (lst Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 889 F.2d 1146, 1150 (lst Cir. 1989)). The court also
noted that "a liberal judicial interpretation is consistent with CERCLA's 'overwhelmingly remedial'
statutory scheme." Id.(quoting United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co. (NEPACCO), 810 F.2d 726,
733 (8th Cir. 1986)).
132. Id.at 1380 81.
133. Id. at 1381-82 ("It is the authority to control the handling and disposal of hazardous
substances that is critical under the statutory scheme." (quoting NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at743) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
134. Id.at 1382 (observing that the instant case's defendants' ownership made a stronger case for
liability than the defendants' ownership in NEPACCO).
135. Id.
136. See id. at 1382 (noting that failing to impose liability under the circumstances would allow
the defendants to turn a blind eye to the method of disposal of the waste).
137. See supra notes 96-118 and accompanying text.
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Lee, actually made the arrangements for disposal.' 38 The issue was whether Lee also
owned or possessed the hazardous substances.' 39 The court used the defendant's
authority to control the hazardous substances to prove constructive possession.14
In Aceto, however, the defendants made no explicit arrangements with Aidex for
disposal.' 4' Indeed, they probably never thought about waste disposal issues at all.
They were, however, owners of hazardous substances who had some degree of
control over the process creating waste that required disposal. 42 In Aceto, unlike
NEPACCO, control does not imply ownership or possession; rather, ownership and
possession plus control imply there is an arrangement for disposal.' 43
Thus, in Aceto, the court's concern was not that someone could avoid liability
by not owning or possessing the waste, even if he or she contributed to the
environmental problem by making arrangements for disposal of hazardous
substances. Rather, the concern was that someone could own the waste and control
the process that created the waste but avoid liability by setting up a contractual
arrangement delegating responsibility for the waste-arranging for disposal-to
someone else.' 44
B. General Electric Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc.
Courts were quick to limit the scope of Aceto, pointing out that not every
business transaction in which one party transfers hazardous substances and
maintains some element of control over those substances is an arrangement for
disposal. In General Electric Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc.,'45 for example,
the court held that oil companies who sell petroleum products to service stations
and have some ability to control activities at the service stations have not arranged
for disposal of waste generated at those service stations.' 46 The court reasoned that,
unlikeAceto, the oil company defendants in AAMCO did not control the manner in
which the hazardous waste was generated.'47 According to the court, the oil

138. 810 F.2d at 743.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1379 (noting plaintiffs allegation that the generation and disposal of
waste was inherent in defendants' arrangement).
142. Id. at 1381 (noting that Aidex performed a process at the direction of the defendants).
143. Id. at 1381 82 (citing NEPACCO, 810 F. 2d at 743) (finding that while NEPACCO imposed
liability on individuals who had the authority to control the disposal of hazardous substances, even if
they did not own or process them, here the defendants both owned the substances and controlledthe
work in process); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 287 (2d Cir.
1992) ("[O]wnership ofhazardous substance, when combined with actual control over the process that
generates the hazardous waste, supports arranger liability.").
144. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1381.
145. 962 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1992).
146. Id. at 287 (citing Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1319 (1 th
Cir. 1990)) (declining to hold defendant liable as an arranger even where defendant could have used
economic bargaining power to force customers to properly dispose of hazardous waste).
147. Id.
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companies' bargaining power, through which they could have controlled the
process, did not create an obligation to control that process. 48
While rejecting the idea that "any entity that merely had the opportunity or
ability to control a third party's waste disposal"' 49 is liable, the AAMCO court
recognized that one can be liable as an arranger without having "active involvement
regarding the timing, manner, or location of disposal."'5 0 The key, the court stated,
is the "nexus between15the
potentially responsible party and the disposal of the
1
hazardous substance.'

To clarify what type of "nexus" is sufficient to impose liability, the court
explained that Congress relied on "traditional notions of duty and obligation" in
determining which parties would be liable under CERCLA.1 2 Thus, it is the
obligation to exercise control that is crucial, not merely the power to exercise
control. What created that obligation inAceto when there was no such obligation
here? The AAMCO court examined two factors that were present inAceto but were
not present in AAMCO: (1) control of the process that3 generated the hazardous
waste and (2) ownership of the hazardous substances.1
In AAMCO, the Second Circuit, by looking to traditional concepts of duty,
moved its analysis closer to negligence. How could it do that and remain true to the
"strict liability" elements of CERCLA? Some courts suggest it could not.1 4 In

148. Id.at 286 (distinguishing the obligation to control, which can be the basis of liability, from
the mere opportunity to control).
149. Id.
150. Id.(quoting CPC Int'l
v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1269, 1279 (W.D. Mich. 1991))
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fla.Power & Light Co., 893 F.2d at1318 (holding that a
manufacturer who does not make "critical decisions" regarding disposal of hazardous material may still
be liable only if there is evidence that the manufacturer was "the party responsible for 'otherwise
arranging' for the disposal of the hazardous substance"); Missouri v. Indep. Petrochemical Corp., 610
F. Supp. 4, 5 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (imposing arranger liability under CERCLA even though defendant had
arranged for waste to be disposed of at a site different from the site where the contamination actually
took place); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884,895 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (holding that CERCLA does
not require, as a prerequisite to liability, that a generator who arranges for disposal know where the
disposal is to take place); New York v. Gen. Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291,297 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding
defendant who sold used transformer oil containing hazardous substances to a drag strip was liable
under CERCLA despite defendant's contention that it had not arranged for disposal but had merely
made a sale of goods).
151. AAMCO, 962 F.2d at 286. This nexus, the court stated, must be based on "the potentially
liable party's conduct with respect to the disposal or transport of hazardous wastes." Id. (citing 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988)).
152. Id.(noting that itis the obligation to exercise control of waste disposal that triggers liability).
153. Id.at 287 ("Unlike the defendants in ... ACETO, the oil companies did not own the
hazardous substance, nor did they control the process by which waste motor oil was generated.").
154. See, e.g., Cal. Dep't of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pacific, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1028,
1037 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 721 (2d Cir.
1993); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 1988); New York v. Shore Realty
Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Marisol, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 833, 838 40
(M.D. Pa. 1989)) (recognizing that CERCLA is a strict liability statute and negligence principles do not
apply).
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reality, however, the Second Circuit's opinion is entirely consistent with tort law
principles of strict liability. The court is not saying that in order to be liable as an
arranger, one has to be negligent. Rather, the court is saying that in order to be
liable as an arranger, there has to be a sufficient nexus between the alleged arranger
and the disposal. 5' If that nexus is such that the alleged arranger had a duty to
control the disposal activity, then that nexus is sufficient to find liability as an
arranger.' 56
By favorably citing B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha'5 7 and CPC International,
Inc. v. Aerojet General Corp.," 8 the AAMCO court made clear that although
knowledge and duty can be sufficient to create liability, they were not necessary." 9
In both cases, the parties were arrangers because they made plans or arrangements
for disposal, even though they did not know the disposed material contained
hazardous substances.' In these types of cases, the defendant's knowledge of the
presence of hazardous substances in the waste is irrelevant. The act of making
arrangements for disposal is sufficient to create liability.
C. GenCorp, Inc. v. Olin Corp.
The Aceto analysis is further explained, and perhaps expanded, in GenCorp,
Inc. v. Olin Corp. 6 ' The contamination at issue was the result of a joint venture,
whereby Olin built a manufacturing facility on land owned by GenCorp, and
GenCorp agreed to purchase half of the plant's output at cost.' 62 GenCorp also
agreed to pay up to half of the capital costs of the facility which would be credited
toward GenCorp's eventual purchase of the plant.' 63 Engineering specifications
were subject to the approval of both companies, and a joint committee oversaw
construction."' GenCorp supplied all of the hourly workers, and Olin supplied

155. AAMCO, 962 F.2d at 286.
156. Id.
157. 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992).
158. 759 F. Supp. 1269 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
159. Id. at 286 (citing B.F. Goodrich, 958 F.2d at 1199; CPC, 759 F. Supp. at 1278).
160. See id at 286; see also B.F. Goodrich,958 F.2d at 1201 (finding municipalities liable for
disposal of hazardous substances despite defendants' argument that "municipal solid waste" was not
defined as a hazardous substance under CERCLA); CPC,759 F. Supp. at 1277 78 (concluding that the
unchecked spread of contaminated groundwater qualifies as disposal, and that a party who neither
created nor owned the contamination could still be liable if that party had assumed responsibility for
determining the "disposition" of the contamination). In CPC, the defendants allegedly engaged in
remedial activities but failed to correct an existing contamination problem that caused additional release
or disposal of hazardous substances at the site. 759 F. Supp. at 1275. In BF. Goodrich,the court held
that a municipality could be liable for arranging for disposal of municipal solid waste even if it had no
reason to know that the municipal solid waste contained hazardous substances. 958 F.2d at 1201.
161. 390 F.3d 433, 445 50 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
162. Id. at 438.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 438 39.
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many of the supervising employees. 6 ' Plant design
contemplated that hazardous
66
waste would be drummed and taken off-site.
The EPA identified Olin as a potentially responsible party for the site where the
hazardous waste from this joint venture facility was sent.'67 The issue for the court
was whether GenCorp was responsible as an arranger as well.6 6 The court began
by noting that the legislation does not define arrange and looked to Webster's
Dictionary which defines arrange as to "plan or prepare" for something.' 69 The
court then noted that to plan or prepare requires intent. 7 ' This intent requirement
is not the intent to have the waste disposed of in a particular manner or at a
particular place.' It is merely the intent to plan or prepare for disposing of the
waste.' 72 The court further stated that intent could be inferred from the
circumstances.' 73 GenCorp argued it could not be liable as an arranger because it
did not "own or possess" the hazardous substances.' 4 The court found that to own
or possess never required holding title or having physical possession. 7 ' The court
cited NEPACCO and a host of similar cases for the proposition that constructive
possession shown by dominion or control could suffice.' 76 The court observed that,
like the defendants inNEPACCO,GenCorp managed activities specifically relating
to the pollution.'77
Thus, the court's reasoning suggests this case is analogous toNEPACCO,with
GenCorp occupying the role of the individual manager who made the arrangements
for disposal.' 78 On the other hand, GenCorp's argument is that it should not be held
liable because the case is factually similar to Aceto but without the element of

165. Id. at 439.
166. Id.at 439 40.
167. Id.at 440.
168. Id. at 445.
169. Id. at 445 (quoting WEBSTER'S 11NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 62 (2001)) ("While the
legislation does not define what it means to 'arrange' for disposal of waste, traditional definitions ofthe
word, its statutory context, and case law supply ample clues.").
170. Id.at 446.
171. Id.
172. Id. ("[O]ne may not become an arranger through inadvertence. The party must have some
intent to make preparations for the disposal of hazardous waste ....
").
173. Id. (citing United States v. Cello-Foil Prods., Inc., 100 F.3d 1227, 1231 (6th Cir. 1996)).
174. Id.
175. Id.at 448 49.
176. See id. (citing United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co. (NEPACCO), 810 F.2d 726, 743
(8th Cir. 1986) and thirteen additional cases for the proposition that dominion and control is enough to
establish constructive possession).
177. Id. at 449. Among the factors listed were the following: (1) GenCorp had equal
representation on the committee that oversaw the construction and operation of the facility, and (2) the
committee approved design plans and budgets that contemplated off-site disposal of hazardous waste.
Id.
178. See id. at 449; see also NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 743 (imposing liability on plant supervisor
who was "directly responsible" for the disposal of hazardous substances).
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ownership.' 7 To determine which case it is more akin to, we need to examine
which element "control" is being used to establish. Is it a case in which control is
being used to prove that the defendants arranged for disposal, as in Aceto, or is it
a case in which control is being used to establish that the defendants owned or
possessed the waste, as in NEPACCO? GenCorp characterized its situation as a
contractual arrangement with the opportunity to control the waste disposal but
without ownership of the hazardous substances.80 This argument indicated that the
EPA was trying to extend the Aceto line of reasoning to cases in which the
defendant did not own the hazardous substances.' 8 ' The court, on the other hand,
concluded that GenCorp was more like the individual defendant in NEPACCO;
GenCorp had control via active participation in the waste generation and disposal
process which established the element of ownership or possession.'82
V.

THE FOUR SCENARIOS AND THE COMPLEX CASES

A.

The Four Scenarios

Every arranger case fits into one of four scenarios. By identifying the kind of
case, conclusions about liability become much clearer. The simplest case is the case
in which the defendant is the generator of the waste.'83 In such cases, the defendant
is clearly liable. There will be very little discussion about ownership or possession
of the waste because the intent of the arranger liability provision was to provide for
generator liability, and everyone who generates waste owns or possesses it at the
time of generation.
The second scenario involves the sale of a useful substance. In such cases there
is no liability because the seller did not arrange for disposal.'84 The issue of
ownership or possession of the hazardous substances is also not relevant to these
cases because, while the seller owned or possessed the item sold, the seller did not
own or possess the hazardous substances at the time of disposal or at the time of
generation of the hazardous waste.
The third scenario involves factual situations similar to the one in NEPACCO.
In such cases, the defendant is neither the generator of the waste nor a seller of

179. See id. at447-48; see also United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1379
(8th Cir. 1989) (defendants arguing that they had no involvement in disposal decision or process).
180. See GenCorp, 390 F.3d at 447.
181. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
182. GenCorp, 390 F.3d at 449.
183. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 190 91 (D.C. Mo.
1985) (finding generator of waste liable for off-site disposal done by third party); United States v. Ward,
618 F. Supp. 884, 895 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (finding generator of waste liable for illegal disposal by a third
party).
184. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. U.S. Gypsum, 711 F. Supp. 1244, 1254 55 (D.N.J. 1989)
(refusing to find sellers of asbestos products liable where there was no "affirmative act" of disposing
of the product other than the sale); Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp.
651,656 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (refusing to impose liability on supplier of chemicals as a sale does not equate
to arranging for disposal), aft'd, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
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hazardous substances.' 85 The defendant may argue that the defendant never owned
or possessed the waste. If a court finds that the defendant's relationship to the waste
was such that the defendant made arrangements or plans for disposal, the defendant
is liable. The defendant does not need to have legal title or physical possession in
order to own or possess the waste. Instead, ownership and possession can be
inferred from control, and control can be inferred from making arrangements for
disposal.186
The fourth scenario involves transactions in which the defendant owns the
hazardous substances, has control over their use, and knows that the substances will
be used in a process that will generate hazardous waste. In such cases, ownership
of the substances is used to imply that the transaction is, or includes, an
arrangement for disposal.' 87 This is the only scenario in which owning or possessing
the waste expands liability beyond the generator.
B.

The Complex Cases

With these four scenarios in mind, this Article will next examine some of the
more difficult arranger cases and demonstrate that placing the cases into one of the
four discussed scenarios can resolve the difficulties. In Morton International,Inc.
v. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co.,' the Third Circuit examined the liability of a
party whose contractual arrangement with the generator made it potentially liable.' 89
The case arose out of contamination at a facility that produced inorganic mercury
compounds. 9 ' Morton was the successor to the owner and the current operator of
the facility. 9' Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company (Tenneco), one of the defendants,
had a complex contractual relationship with Morton's predecessor, which Morton
alleged included ownership of the raw materials during processing at the facility
and purchase of the mercury compounds after processing at the facility.' 92 Morton
instituted an action against Tenneco alleging that the agreements between Tenneco
and Morton's predecessor made Tenneco liable as an arranger. 9 ' Tenneco

185. See, e.g., United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co. (NEPACCO), 810 F.2d 726,743 (8th Cir.
1988) (holding parties liable absent ownership or possession based on the control the party had over the
waste); United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1306 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (finding the plant supervisor
liable because of his "ultimate authority for decisions regarding disposal" of the waste).
186. See discussion supra Part IlI.C.
187. See, e.g., United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 82 (8th Cir.
1989) (citations omitted) (finding arranger liability where the defendant sent hazardous materials to the
manufacturer foruse in manufacturing the product for the defendant, the defendant owned the chemicals
throughout the process, and the defendant knew the process created hazardous waste).
188. 343 F.3d 669 (3d Cir. 2003).
189. Id. at 675 79.
190. Id. at 673.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 673. There was some factual dispute as to the nature of the transactions and whether
Tenneco shipped "dirty mercury" to the plant. See id.
193. Id. at 674.
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described the transactions as straight sales and argued that as a purchaser of a
product it was not an arranger with regard to waste generated at a facility unless it
had had some control over the activities at the facility." 4
The court began its discussion by noting that nearly all of its "sister circuit
courts [had] adopted a standard for 'arranger liability,' but the standards adopted
var[ied]."' 9 5 The court noted that there were two areas in which the courts agreed,
but that there was "not... much agreement among our sister circuits as to which
factors must be considered."' 96 The court then proceeded to list the areas of
disagreement.117 An examination of what the court viewed as areas of disagreement
shows that, rather than real disagreement, proof of arranger liability differs
depending on the type of case at issue. Within each scenario, however, there are
very few areas of disagreement.
The first area of disagreement the Morton court identified concerned intent.'
The court noted that the Cello-Foil and Amcast courts both required intentional
action, whereas Aceto rejected the idea that arranger liability "requires proof that
defendant intended to dispose of a waste."' 99 Note that both Cello-Foiland Amcast
are sales cases.2"'
It is important to understand that the role of intent addressed by these courts
differs based on the scenario. In the sales cases, like Cello-FoilandAmcast, the key
distinction is whether the transaction involves the sale of a useful product or the
disposal of a waste. In these cases, the intent of the parties, specifically whether the
parties intended to discard something, determines whether there has been an
arrangement for disposal. In Aceto, on the other hand, the arrangement clearly
involved the generation and disposal of waste.2 ' InAceto, whether the defendants
intended to dispose of the waste or ignored the issue was not relevant.2"2 The

194. See id.at 674.
195. Id. at 676 77 (citing Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco Inc., 234 F.3d 917, 929 (5th Cir.
2001); Freeman v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 189 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 1999); Pneumo Abex Corp. v.
High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R., 142 F.3d 769, 775 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Cello-Foil
Prods., Inc., 100 F.3d 1227, 1231 32 (6th Cir. 1996); S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Montalvo, 84 F.3d
402,407 (1 th Cir. 1996); Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 1993); JonesHamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 695 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F. 2d 1373, 1381-82 (8th Cir. 1989)).
196. Id. at 677. The areas of agreement were that (1) the inquiry regarding arranger liability is
"fact-sensitive," and that (2) the courts should look beyond "defendant's characterization of the
transaction." Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.(citing Cello-Foil, 100 F.3d at 1232; Amcast, 2 F.3d at 751; Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1380).
199. Id. Even the language quoted indicates a lack of parallel between the cases being contrasted.
For example, the court quoted Anicast for the proposition that arranged for "impl[ies] intentional
action," id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Anicast, 2 F.3d at751) (internal quotation marks omitted),
while citing Aceto for the proposition that intent to dispose of waste is not required, id.(citing Aceto,
872 F.2d at 1380).
200. See discussion supra Part lll.B.2.
201. See Aceto, 872 F.2d at1375-76.
202. See id. at 1380 81.
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defendants engaged in intentional action they knew would produce waste.2 3 This
is similar to the intent required by the courts in sales cases. In both sets of cases,
courts do not require proof of intent in addition to proof of arranging for disposal;
both agree the intent that was not required in Aceto is not required in a sales case.
However, intent becomes a means of proving an arrangement for disposal because
an act of arrangement does not occur accidentally. Thus, arranging for disposal
requires some intentional action, but there is not a separate requirement that the
parties intend to dispose of waste.
The Morton court next noted the disagreement regarding the importance of
ownership or control, 20 4 citing UnitedStates v. Hercules Inc.205 and Jones-Hamilton
Co. v. Beazer Materials & Services, Inc.216 for the proposition that control is not
necessary, 2 7 and United States v.2' Shell Oil Co. 218 for the opposite proposition that
control is the "crucial element. 01
Again, observation of the differences in the fact patterns reveals no real dispute
among the cases. Both the Hercules and Jones-Hamilton courts noted that where
there is ownership of the waste, there is no need to show control.210 The Shell case,
on the other hand, was an attempt to impose arranger liability on the U.S.
government based on the level of controlthe government exercised over activities
at the facility during World War l."211 The case is similar to Aceto, but without the
element of ownership. There is, therefore, no liability. The ability to control, the
court noted, is important, but not sufficient.21 2
The Shell court went further to distinguish ability to control from actual
control.21 3 It viewed NEPACCO as based on actual control because the defendant
controlled the waste disposal decisions, which can be a basis of liability, and

203. Id. at 1381.
204. 343 F.3d at 677.
205. 247 F.3d 706, 720 (8th Cir. 2001). The Hercules court made the important distinction
between NEPACCO, in which there was no ownership and thus control was essential to liability, and
Aceto, in which ownership was clear and thus control was not necessary to impose liability. Id. (citing
Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1381 82; United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co. (NEPACCO), 810 F.2d 726, 743
(8th Cir. 1986)). Thus, the court concluded that "[c]ontrol, therefore, is not a necessary factor in every
case of arranger liability." Id.
206. 973 F.2d 688, 695 (9th Cir. 1992). The Jones-Hamiltoncase followedAceto in holding that
where the defendant retains ownership of the hazardous substances and enters into an agreement that
clearly contemplates the disposal of some of those substances as waste, arranger liability exists even
without a showing of control. Id. (citing Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1380-81).
207. See supra notes 206 07 and accompanying text.
208. 294 F.3d 1045, 1055 (9th Cir. 2002).
209. Id.
210. See Hercules, 247 F.3d at 720; Jones-Hamilton,973 F.2d at 695 (citing Aceto, 872 F.2d at
1380 81). This is consistent with the discussion above that control is used to create constructive
possession which satisfies the owned or possessed by requirement. See supra notes 110 18 and
accompanying text.
211. Shell, 294 F.3d at 1055.
212. Id. at 1057.
213. Id. at 1057 (citing United States v. Ne. Pharm. Chem. Co. (NEPACCO), 810 F.2d 726 (8th
Cir. 1986)).
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reasoned the Shell case was more like AAMCO, where there was authority but no
actual control.2" 4 The Shell court quoted the decision in United States v. Iron
MountainMines, Inc.2" which made the distinction that if a party was the source
of pollution or actively managed it for example, if the defendant was a waste
generator or actively managed waste disposal as the NEPACCO defendants
217
did 216-there can be liability without actually owning or possessing the waste.
However, if a party is not the source of the waste and did not actively manage its
disposal, control cannot create liability2 18 unless the defendant also owns the
hazardous substances as in Aceto.2 9
The Morton court, after its analysis of the other decisions, stated that arranger
liability "should focus on" the three factors: (1) ownership or possession of the
hazardous substance, and either (2) the defendant's knowledge that the processing
will result in the generation of hazardous waste or (3) control of the production
process.220 Proof of ownership or possession of the material would be required, and
then the plaintiff would have to show either knowledge or control of the process to
succeed.22'
In assessing these factors, the Morton court found that there were disputed
issues as to whether Tenneco owned the hazardous materials during the
processing. 22 Tenneco did, however, have enough experience with similar
processes to know that hazardous waste would result. 223 Regarding control, the
court was faced with disputed facts.224 To some extent, the Morton court was
looking at a case that could have been analogous to AAMCO where no ownership
would result in no liability, 225 or to NEPACCO, in which case there would be
liability. 226 A trier of fact was needed to determine whether defendants had
sufficient ownership and control over the waste disposal issues to meet the owned
or possessed by requirement and create liability. 227 In other words, a trier of fact
was needed to determine which type of case the court was dealing with.
The first case to attempt to apply the Morton factors was Agere Systems, Inc.
v. Advanced Environmental Technology Corporation.2 28 The court addressed a
claim against a contractor, AETC, who had agreed to remove and dispose of waste
from several sites and had contracted with another party for the disposal of waste

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id.; see supra notes 148 53 and accompanying text.
881 F. Supp. 1432 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
Shell, 294 F.3d at 1058 (quoting Iron Mountain, 881 F. Supp. at 1451).
Id.
See supra notes 122-35 and accompanying text.
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669, 677 78 (3d Cir. 2003).
Id.
Id. at 681.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 683.
See supra notes 145 48 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
Morton, 343 F.3d at 683.
No. 02-3830, 2006 WL 3366167, at *3 8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2006).
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that was sent to the sites.229 The court began its discussion by noting that "the plain
language of the statute" requires a plaintiff "to show ownership or possession of the
waste. ''2u The court observed that the Morton court had also required ownership or
possession. 3' The Agere court stated that ownership or possession, however, could
be proved by constructive ownership or possession.2"2 In this case, AETC exercised
control because it had a contractual obligation to arrange for disposal of the waste
and in fact contracted with another party to fulfill that obligation.233 The court
concluded, therefore, this case was like NEPACCO with regard to ownership or
control.234
The defense argued that the case was analogous to Aceto without ownership.235
The ownership or possession element was allegedly missing because the waste was
taken to a site different from the site requested by the defendant.236 The defendant
argued this demonstrated its lack of control. 7 The court rejected that argument,
reasoning that one with control over the waste disposal decision should not be able
to escape liability by transferring the waste to a third party it does not control.238
The next factor required by Morton was either control ofthe production process
or knowledge that the process would result in disposal of hazardous waste.239 One
factor or the other is required in cases such as Aceto and Morton, but neither is
necessary in generator cases. Indeed, this factor does not make sense in a case in
which there is no process to control. The court recognized this, but nevertheless
concluded that Morton intended its rule to apply to all arranger cases.240 The court
then analyzed AETC's knowledge and determined that because AETC made waste
disposal decisions, it had to know that waste disposal would result.24'
The court discussed the relationship between control as a means of proving
constructive possession and control of the disposal process as a means of showing

229. Id. at *2.The court noted that when the defendant contracted to remove the waste and
transport it for delivery, itcould have performed the work itself or hired an outside company. Id. at* 1.
Had the company performed the work itself, it would only be a transporter of the waste. However, it
exposed itself to arranger liability when it "independently contracted with Manfred DeRewal ...to
perform the removal, transportation, and disposal." Id.
230. Id. at *3.
231. Id.(citing Morton, 343 F.3d at 678).
232. Id. at *3 (citing United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co. (NEPACCO), 810 F.2d 726, 743
(8th Cir. 1986)).
233. Id.at*4.("AETC exercised control over the waste when itagreed by contract to dispose of
the waste and independently hired DeRewal to perform the removal and disposal.").
234. Id.at *3 (citing NEPACCO, 810 F.2d at 743).
235. Id. at *5.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.at *6.
239. Id.
240. Id.at*3 (citing Morton Int'l, Inc. v. A.E.Staley Mfg. Co., 343 F.3d 669, 679 (3d Cir. 2003)).
241. Id.at *8. The court rejected the defendant's argument that liability should be premised on
the ability to make decisions as to the actual manner and location of the disposal, not just the ability to
make waste disposal decisions in general. Id. at*6-7.
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that the defendant arranged for the disposal; thus, the court apparently recognized
that in different fact patterns, control can play different roles.242 However, because
the court believed the Morton rule was intended to apply to all arranger cases, it
addressed whether there were in fact fewer factors relevant to arranger liability,
with control being the key to both the owned or possessed by requirement and the
control of the process requirement.243
By attempting to apply the Morton rule,244 the court made a fairly simple case
difficult. The court should have noted that control plays a different role in different
types of cases. In cases like NEPACCO, control of the disposal process is used to
prove constructive possession, and once one controls the disposal process, one is
an arranger. No other element of control is necessary. In cases like Aceto, on the
other hand, control of the process that creates the waste and knowledge that waste
is being created are relevant, but only because the defendant did not make waste
related decisions. In such a case, control and knowledge are necessary to show that
there was an arrangement for disposal. Thus, the court took a simple case in which
the defendant was liable because it undisputedly made the arrangements for
disposal, a case like NEPACCO, and made it more complex by unnecessarily
searching for other elements of control.
VI. CONCLUSION

The role of ownership or possession in arranger liability has been a source of
considerable controversy. This controversy stems from the fact that ownership or
possession plays a different role depending on the fact pattern. Within each type of
fact pattern, however, there is a great deal of consistency. When the defendant is
the generator of the waste or the seller of a useful substance, ownership or
possession of the waste is not a critical element. Every generator owns or possesses
the waste at the time of generation, and the seller clearly has no ownership or
possession at the time of generation of the waste. In cases like NEPACCO, making
decisions regarding waste disposal satisfies the ownership or possession
requirement, and the defendant will be held liable. In cases like Aceto, where the
contractual arrangement does not overtly address waste generation and disposal,
ownership of the hazardous substances establishes the control necessary to impose
a duty on the defendant to assure proper disposal of the waste. Once one
understands the four possible fact patterns, the role of ownership or possession in
arranger liability becomes clear. The variety of approaches taken by the courts is
not evidence of "disagreement" on the issue; instead, the variety of approaches

242. Id. at *6.
243. Id. at *7. The court noted that the Morton court had recognized that these factors were related
and that, in some cases, proof of control could be sufficient for arranger liability. See id. (citing Morton,
343 F.3d at 679).
244. The court recognized the rule could not be applied literally because there was no process to
control. Id. Control of the process makes sense as a factor only in cases like Aceto where there is a
process to control.
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reflects the four distinct scenarios that give rise to arranger liability, and the role of
ownership or possession differs depending on the scenario.
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